

DEFINING RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT

War Crimes Committed in the Second World War

After imperial Japan's military sex slave system came under public scrutiny in the 1990s, the Japanese government adopted a policy of denying official responsibility that has persisted into the present day. Park explores concepts of responsibility and dessert in arguing forcefully for official recognition of the sex crimes perpetrated by the Japanese military in the Second World War.

Michelle Park

Stanford University

The euphemistic term *ianfu*, or “comfort women,” was invented by imperial Japan to refer to its military sex slaves, who were subjected not only to repeated rapes but also to hard labor, near-starvation, physical torture and verbal abuse.^{1,2} During World War II, the Japanese government used deceptive rhetoric to force an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 women from East Asian, Southeast Asian, and Pacific Island countries into military brothels where each woman was raped daily by dozens of Japanese soldiers.³ About 80 percent of these women were from Korea, partly because Koreans were colonial subjects of Japan from 1910 to 1945.^{4,5} Laura Hein, a professor of Japanese history at Northwestern University, argues that young Korean women were also targeted because Japanese military planners considered them racially inferior to the Japanese, but free of sexually transmitted diseases due to Confucian preoccupation with female chastity.⁶ Following the pattern of most colonial operations, local personnel were involved, and a number of comfort women “recruiters” were Korean.⁷ But the driving force behind the human trafficking was always the Japanese government’s goal of filling

their military brothels, using unscrupulous means if necessary. Traffickers lured unsuspecting girls into sexual slavery with promises of honorable jobs under the Jungshindae, or Women’s Voluntary Service Corps.^{8,9} The young women faced entirely involuntary fates, and the few who returned home continued to suffer from chronic health problems, unaddressed psychological trauma, and further isolation by their home communities.^{10,11}

Survivors, however, hid their experiences for half a century as Confucian notions of chastity reminded them of their personal guilt and the shame they brought to their communities.¹² It was only with the support of a budding women’s movement in Korea that former comfort women could begin to speak. The first public testimony was given by Kim Haksun in August 1991, and marked the beginning of a process in which the burden of guilt were transferred from the victimized women to perpetrators of the crimes.^{13,14,15} A stubborn Japanese government refused to give an official apology or monetary compensation,¹⁶ but the publicity that was generated brought together activists from around the world who convinced the United Nations to

bring up the issue in multiple conferences.¹⁷ In 1993, in the face of concerted international effort, the Japanese government acknowledged that it played an unspecified role in the establishment and running of comfort women stations. Nonetheless, it has yet to accept any binding responsibility, insisting that the San Francisco Peace Treaty and various bilateral agreements have settled all postwar claims of compensation.^{18,19}

Though historical evidence of the *ianfu* system had been in public archives and academic writings since the end of the war, the Korean government, too, seemed content to ignore the matter.^{20,21} After feminist groups placed the issue in the international spotlight, the government published several reports denouncing the Japanese government for evading blame.²² In 2005, however, declassified documents detailing negotiations that led to the normalization of Korea-Japan relations in 1965 revealed that South Korea had agreed not to make further compensation demands for Japan's colonial rule after receiving \$800 million in grants and soft loans.^{23,24} This finding spurred advocates of war victims in Korea to file compensation lawsuits against the government.

The delay in public airing of former comfort women's experiences due to social stigma, and the poor efforts to distribute compensation on the part of the Korean government, reveal that it is important not to bypass or discount the ways in which years of sexual assault and oppressive living conditions during the war continue to affect the women after their emancipation. Yet, while Korean society and its government have succeeded in coming to terms with their responsibility in this matter, the Japanese government still evades blame for the trauma

incurred on these women. It is critical for the closure of this issue that the Japanese government accepts its full legal and ethical responsibility by directly facilitating the rehabilitation of victims.

The term "sex slave," while far more accurate than "comfort woman," fails to capture the experiences of the victims. Since Kim Haksun spoke, dozens of women have broken their fifty-year silence in an attempt to achieve justice, regain part of their dignity, and secure the economic stability necessary to begin their healing. Their stories contain similar threads: deception that brought them into "comfort stations," rapes and debilitating living conditions that were endured inside these stations, and continued suffering after the war as outcasts of family and society. The following account of an anonymous Korean comfort woman illustrates how testimonies that neutrally dictate the facts of their experience still evoke vivid images and emotions:

I was deceived by an agent from the Korean Peninsula. I thought that comfort for the army meant comforting the troops by dancing and singing, and that would be all right. And the agent told me the same thing. When we crossed the border into China, [he] ordered me to "take customers" . . . With no warning, they raped me. I became desperate. One after another, so many of them. . . When it is busy, I just lie down on my back, eating rice balls with my legs spread apart, and the soldiers come and mount me and leave, mount me and leave. There's a heavy, dull pain that lasts all day.²⁵

As the woman above discovered, deception was common during the recruitment of Korean comfort women. Japanese colonial forces made a policy of hiring locals to procure young women for their military, by whatever means necessary.²⁶ Under encouragement of laws such as the National

General Mobilization Ordinance, kidnappings and forced recruitments became so frequent that many parents rushed their young daughters into marriage to reduce the likelihood of capture.^{27,28} Recruiters specifically targeted girls from poor families, luring them with promises of high-paying jobs and a chance to travel abroad and serve their country—a simple feat during the economic depression of the colonial period.^{29,30} Sixteen-year-old Song Shindo, for example, was approached by a beautifully dressed Korean woman who asked, “Won’t you go to the front and work for your country?”³¹ UN Special Rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy noted in her report “On Violence Against Women,” that Japanese authorities had hired unscrupulous Koreans to recruit girls under the guise of the Jungshindae, or Women’s Voluntary Service Corps, which allegedly provided women with jobs in factories or other war-related tasks.

Korean comfort women’s testimonies have been invaluable in exposing the inhumane conditions under which the Japanese military imposed “systematic rape”—a phrase used by the United Nations to describe sexual exploitation of the comfort women.³² Min Pyonggap, a Professor of Sociology at Queens College of CUNY, gleaned common experiences from interviews conducted by The Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan, with seventy-six former Korean comfort women, as well as from his own interviews with nineteen survivors.³³ His findings conform with nineteen first-hand accounts collected, translated, and published by the Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues.³⁴ Most women serviced ten to thirty soldiers on an average day.^{35,36,37} As exceptions to this general

trend, Kim Daeil and the forty girls with her “were forced to service forty to fifty soldiers a day.”³⁸ The first-hand accounts, as well as the military notes and medical records, all reveal that soldiers frequently tortured, burned, beat, and occasionally stabbed the girls, who were housed in overcrowded, dirty, and disease-ridden shanties.^{39,40} Pak Duri explains how common physical punishment had been:

When one of us broke even a minor rule, we were all punished with beatings, mainly on our heads and legs. . . Sometimes when they beat us, I tried to cover myself with my hands. So they hit my hands and broke my fingers.⁴¹

Sexually transmitted diseases and numerous suicide attempts crippled or killed many women.^{42,43} Even medical treatments contributed to morbidity and mortality. For example, a compound containing highly toxic arsenic labeled #606 was prescribed for syphilis, which induced abortion in pregnant women and contributed to sterility.⁴⁴ Authorities insisted on the use of condoms, but the soldiers often refused to wear the thick, crude saku, meaning “sack.”⁴⁵ When supplies ran short, as was often the case, some women were forced to wash used cloth condoms for reuse.⁴⁶ Unsurprisingly, many women became pregnant. Most pregnant women miscarried, often because of beatings, and those who did not were forced to abort their babies.^{47,48}

Consequences of the Japanese government’s ianfu system did not end when the war concluded and the comfort women released. Survival meant the end of one nightmare and the beginning of another which entailed struggling on their own with disease, debilitating injuries, and severe psychological trauma.⁴⁹ Victim-blaming attitudes

often drove them out of their parents' homes and forced them to live, or often die from, a hard life of constant labor and suffering.⁵⁰ Some women had to have their uteruses removed because of diseases and damage from countless rapes.⁵¹ In a society that attached great importance to the birth of heirs, the sterile women could not marry.⁵² Of those who managed to eventually marry, many divorced early because of infertility or because their husbands had found out about their past.⁵³ On July 2, 1994, an anonymous comfort woman appealed to the Japanese government for recognition:

If I were to speak to the Japanese government, there is only one question I would ask: is it right to ignore me like this as if they did nothing to me? Are they justified after trampling an innocent and fragile teenage girl and making her suffer for the rest of her life? How would you feel if your own daughter met the same fate as mine?⁵⁴

The Japanese government's response came too late and with too little sincerity. Historical facts regarding comfort women had long been available to the public; University of Tokyo professor and leading feminist scholar Chizuko Ueno states in her book *Nationalism and Gender* that as many as 30,000 war diaries and memoirs of former soldiers had been in public archives since the end of the war.⁵⁵ In 1990, burgeoning women's groups finally brought allegations of forced wartime prostitution to the Japanese National Diet. The Japanese government responded by issuing a statement denying government involvement in the comfort women system.⁵⁶ Dozens of women's groups immediately sent letters of protest, and in November of that same year, a group of women established the Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan.⁵⁷ These revolutionary

Korean feminists assured the rape victims that "ones who ought to feel shame are not the former comfort women." They proved instrumental in convincing Kim Haksun and two other victims to file a class-action lawsuit against the Japanese government in December 1991.^{58,59,60} It took another year and eight months to uncover incriminating war documents with the help of academics such as Yoshimi Yoshiaki, disclosures by women's groups and newspapers, testimonies of former Japanese military personnel, and condemning reports from the United Nations. On August 4, 1993, the Japanese government finally acknowledged some "direct or indirect" involvement in the operation of comfort stations.^{61,62,63}

As UN Special Rapporteur Gay McDougall revealed in her report "Systematic rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict," the Japanese government, while admitting a role in the existence of comfort stations, has consistently denied any legal responsibility for the victims. The Japanese government cites the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea and other bilateral agreements to absolve itself of liability for the affliction of the women it once enslaved. Japan's conservative faction, the Liberal Democratic Party, is mainly responsible for these evasive maneuvers and insincere rhetoric; more progressive parties such as the former Japan Socialist Party and the Democratic Party of Japan have insisted on an earnest apology and compensation.⁶⁴ In June 1995, the Murayama cabinet reached a compromise by creating the Asian Women's Fund (AWF), a source of unofficial compensation raised by both the Japanese people and the government. Although official documents proclaimed the AWF

as “an expression of atonement on the part of the Japanese people toward these [comfort] women,” the Japanese government “regularly reiterated that it supported AWF projects out of moral responsibility and that legal compensation issues had been settled.”⁶⁵ Advocate groups in Korea and Japan were outraged at yet another tactic to avoid full acceptance of responsibility, and they advised the comfort women survivors to refuse the AWF money.⁶⁶ Among the nineteen women interviewed by Min Pyonggap, “all but a few” agreed with their supporters and “expressed the strong feeling” that they should not accept money from the AWF. Seventy-year-old Kim Sooja articulated the sentiments of most of her fellow survivors:

*It is more important to get a sincere apology than simply to get monetary compensation. I am not merchandise that can be traded for money. . . I will never accept money from the Asian Women's Fund. The Japanese government should make a sincere apology and directly compensate me.*⁶⁷

Conservatives in Japan must have lamented the fact that feminists, human rights activists, and at long last the comfort women themselves had come to join forces in the 1990s to “generate a problem where none existed,” after fifty years of silence. In 1998, the United Nations condemned the ianfu system as a “war crime” as well as a “crime against humanity,” refuted the Japanese government’s excuses, and unequivocally demanded redress in three forms: (1) “full and unqualified acceptance by the Government of Japan of legal liability and the consequences that flow from such liability,” which include (2) “individual compensation to the former ‘comfort women’ by the Government of Japan” and (3) the prosecution of “government and military

personnel . . . for their culpability in establishing and maintaining the rape centers.”⁶⁸ The government of Japan complied with none of these requirements. So when Japanese Prime Minister Murayama offered a handshake to former comfort woman Lee Jisook, she directly confronted the head of state, saying, “Your government destroyed my life. . . You should give me back my lost youth.”⁶⁹ Kim Soonduk expressed similar regrets at losing her youth and at having “no place to go” when she returned to Seoul. But in her response to the shallow apologies, she speaks not of past oppression but of current need for government accountability:

*[The Japanese government's] apologies are only half-hearted. They try to let civilian organizations pay some compensation. But it was the government's deeds. The Japanese government must compensate us.*⁷⁰

While the Japanese government evaded formal legal responsibility for the comfort women system, the Korean government also failed to step up to its task of aiding the women in their compensation. Only after the comfort women survivors had filed suit in Japan did the Republic of Korea criticize the Japanese government for failing to fully investigate the ianfu system.⁷¹ In March 1993, South Korean President Kim Youngsam announced that Seoul would not pursue material compensation from Japan for former comfort women in compliance with the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations, but encouraged Tokyo to thoroughly and publicly investigate the issue.⁷² According to a May 2001 paper by Soh Sarah, a sociocultural anthropologist at Sogang University in Seoul, President Kim had in his speech intended to elevate Korea to a position of “moral superiority” over Japan in forging a new

relationship with the former colonialists.

While Soh legitimately argues that President Kim was innocently promoting nationalistic pride after a dark period in history, documents released by the South Korean government on January 17, 2005 brought to light its self-incriminating actions. These documents detail the minutes of the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations, and disclose that the South Korean government, after receiving \$800 million in grants and soft loans, agreed not to pursue any further compensation from Japan.⁷³ Of the \$800 million, it had specifically demanded \$364 million as compensation for an estimated 1.03 million Koreans conscripted to labor or military service during the Japanese occupation.⁷⁴ When the government closed payments in 1975, however, it had only distributed a total of about \$2.5 million to victims, using the remaining \$361.5 million for large-scale economic projects.⁷⁵

Revelations that the Korean government had redirected compensation funds toward economic purposes in the Korean development era of the 1960s undermined its pedestal of moral superiority. Conservatives in the Japanese government were undoubtedly pleased, for besides shifting much of the political and media attention to Korea from their own backs, these sensitive documents gave powerful backing to their claim that an official apology was unwarranted because all legal matters concerning comfort women had been settled. In Korea, it was not comfort women survivors, but rather other victims of Japanese colonization who bombarded their government with lawsuits and demands for compensation.^{76,77} Much like comfort women victims, 79-year-old Kim Kyeongseok, head of the Association for Pacific War Victims,

had been dragged into forced labor for Japan at the young age of eighteen, and desired government compensation:

We make this request while we are alive, even if just for a little longer. . . Frankly, all I want is a little so-called compensation to buy just one box of medicine. . . We're going to have to fight this for many days. The nation mustn't turn its back on its people.⁷⁸

Former comfort woman Lee Okseon then took the microphone from his hands, elaborating on what it meant for both governments to effectively evade responsibility:

Many comfort women died of diseases or were massacred all at once, but the Japanese government might say it never happened . . . If we are discarded by Japan, and Korea ignores us, in whom are we to believe?⁷⁹

As more comfort women offered to testify, their listeners discovered that they were also “unhappy with the Korean government,” as Kim Soonduk explained in October 1994. “They asked us to come out from hiding and to speak out to let people know the truth,” Kim said, “So I did. I spoke out my past that had been hidden even from my mother. Now I wish the Korean government would be more forceful in representing our interests.”⁸⁰ Kim’s wish was representative of many more comfort women’s testimonies and came even before the release of declassified documents in 2005. After disclosing its clandestine negotiations with Japan, the Korean government came under fire from the Korean people as well as the international community. Unlike the Japanese government, however, the Korean government has taken a significant step forward by agreeing in May 2006 to compensate the victims of Japanese colonial rule, announcing that it will

divide a minimum of \$400 million among “those conscripted as soldiers, military civilians, laborers or ‘comfort women.’”^{81,82}

Beginning with Kim Haksun’s landmark testimony in 1991, Korea as a nation stood behind the comfort women in their pursuit of justice. Certainly, the Korean government was quick to draw attention to crimes committed by its former colonial power. The question remains, however, of why it took fifty years before the ianfu system was challenged in the 1990s. An examination of cultural factors reveals a possible reason for the prolonged silence. Confucian ethics, incorporated into Korean culture during the 518-year Joseon dynasty (1392-1910), both glorified chastity and imposed a sexual double standard that discriminated against women well into the 20th century.⁸³ The combined effect of venerating female chastity and tolerating male promiscuity distorted the experience of sexual abuse and created a situation where the female victim rather than the male offender was considered at fault.⁸⁴

Sexist double standards not only influenced comfort women’s life after the war, but also were responsible for the formation of the ianfu system. A Japanese WWII officer’s disturbing views embody the type of androcentric thinking that resulted in the Japanese military’s crimes of sexual assault.

*I knew that as a result of (being without access to women), men’s mental conditions ends up declining, and that’s when I realized once again the necessity of special comfort stations. This desire is the same as hunger or the need to urinate, and soldiers merely thought of comfort stations as practically the same as latrines.*⁸⁵

The idea of comfort stations as being practically the same as latrines seems ridiculously exaggerated,

and the androcentric mindset behind the officer’s words is obvious. First, the officer presumes that “being without access to women” is a causal factor for the decline of “men’s mental conditions,” not taking into account other, more likely, factors such as psychological trauma from the violence of war. Without giving thought to the fact that the women would be uprooted from families, debilitated with trauma and disease, and condemned to a future of stigma and isolation, the military chose as their “solution,” to force them into brothels.

Within brothels, the suffering of comfort women were intensified by Confucian values of chastity they had internalized. In the words of seventy-year-old Hwang Keuju, “[The soldiers] had no idea that for us, Korean women, chastity was more precious than life itself.”⁸⁶ Internationally renowned historian and author of *The Rape of Nanking* Iris Chang notes that in the case of rapes in Nanking, the idea of female chastity “perpetuated the belief that any woman who could live through such a degrading experience and not commit suicide was herself an affront to society.”⁸⁷ Chang suggests that Confucian values in China not only worked to idolize “female purity,” but also held victims of sexual assault solely responsible for finding a way to regain their trampled dignity, in extreme cases, through suicide. Considering that comfort women victims went back home to a similarly patriarchal society critical of unchaste women, it becomes less difficult to understand why the thousands of survivors hid their “degrading experiences” so fearfully and for so long.

Despite lingering gender inequalities, Korean society has in many ways moved beyond sexism originating from entrenched Confucian practices.

Modern Korean women are supported by public policy promoting equality and expect to be treated as equals at home and in the workplace. Behind the progress has been women's movement whose growth has been accelerated by comfort women issues, and is still young and full of potential. The one arena in which participation of women remains disproportionately low is politics; women's representation in national parliament was a modest 13.4 percent as of July 2007.⁸⁸ The percentage for Japan was a lower 9.4 percent.

At the moment, the Japanese government continues to reiterate that they need not provide compensation for comfort women, especially since the South Korean government agreed not to make further compensation demands in 1965. According to McDougall's 1998 UN report, however, the Japanese government is still legally responsible for the ianfu system, for Japan violated multiple international agreements prohibiting slavery, rape, and "crimes against humanity." The third demand of the UN report, that government and military personnel be prosecuted for setting up and running rape centers, has no connection to the Korean

government's compensation of victims and should be carried out before the criminals pass away.

Both the explosive progress of the Korean feminist movement as well as the Korean government's full acceptance of responsibility for victims of the colonial period underscore the Japanese government's shortcomings. Although the Japanese government, the Korean government, and Korean society have all contributed to the physical and emotional trauma forced upon the comfort women, only the Japanese government still purports to be justified in ignoring the victims of sexual slavery. Throughout the years since the first investigation into the ianfu system, the international community has been unrelentingly clear in demanding that Japan follow instructions of the United Nations and provide the redress stipulated therein. By stretching to find loopholes that will absolve itself of formal responsibility, the Japanese government continues to send a message of having little concern for international law, public opinion, and the criminal nature of actions committed in the "comfort stations."



ENDNOTES

- 1 C. Sarah Soh, "Japan's Responsibility Toward Comfort Women Survivors," Japan Policy Research Institute (May 2001), <<http://www.jpri.org/publications/workingpapers/wp77.html>>.
- 2 Bonnie B. C. Oh, "The Japanese Imperial System and the Korean 'Comfort Women' of World War II," in Margaret D. Stetz and Bonnie B. C. Oh, ed., *Legacies of the Comfort Women of World War II* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2001), 3.
- 3 Pyong Gap Min, "Korean 'Comfort Women': The Intersection of Colonial Power, Gender, and Class," *Gender Society*, vol. 17, issue 6 (2003), 940.
- 4 Ibid., 941.
- 5 Laura Hein, "Savage Irony: the Imaginative Power of the 'Military Comfort Women' in the 1990s," *Gender & History*, vol. 11 (1999), 339.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II*, Suzanne O'Brien trans. (New York, NY: Columbia UP, 2000), 103-108.
- 8 Radhika Coomaraswamy, United Nations Commission On Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur On Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences (4 Jan. 1996), <<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/b6ad5f3990967f3e802566d600575fcb?Opendocument>>.
- 9 Yoshiaki, 103-104.
- 10 George Hicks, *The Comfort Women* (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1995).
- 11 Chizuko Ueno, *Nationalism and Gender*, Beverley Yamamoto, trans. (Melbourne, Australia: Trans Pacific P, 2004), 73.
- 12 Ibid., 70-71.
- 13 Names are in Korean order with family name first, followed by the two-syllable personal name.

- 14 "History of the Korean Council," The Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (2004), <http://www.womenandwar.net/english/menu_012.php>.
- 15 Ueno, 71.
- 16 Soh, "Japan's Responsibility Toward Comfort Women Survivors."
- 17 "Comfort-Women.org: Chronology of Dates and Events," Washington Coalition for Comfort Women Issues, Inc., <<http://www.comfort-women.org/v2/history.html>>.
- 18 Soh, "Japan's Responsibility Toward Comfort Women Survivors."
- 19 Gay J McDougall, United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Commission On Human Rights, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict (22 June 1998), <<http://www.unhcr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/3d25270b5fa3ea998025665f0032f220?OpenDocument>>.
- 20 Hereafter, "the Korean government" refers to the South Korean government.
- 21 Ueno, 69.
- 22 C. Sarah Soh, "The Comfort Women Project," San Francisco State University (3 Mar. 2002), <<http://online.sfsu.edu/~soh/comfortwomen.html>>.
- 23 "S. Korea Discloses Sensitive Documents," United Press International (17 Jan. 2005), <<http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20050117-025138-3813r.htm>>.
- 24 "Declassified Documents Could Trigger Avalanche of Lawsuits," The Chosun Ilbo (17 Jan. 2005), <<http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200501/200501170025.html>>.
- 25 Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military During World War II*, Suzanne O'Brien trans. (New York, NY: Columbia UP, 2000), qtd. in 147-148.
- 26 Yoshiaki, 103-108.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Hicks, 27.
- 29 Ustina Dolgopol and Snehal Paranjape, "Comfort Women: an Unfinished Ordeal," Geneva, Switzerland: International Commission of Jurists (14 Mar. 2006), <http://www.comfort-women.org/Unfinished.htm>, par. 11-12.
- 30 Oh, 11.
- 31 qtd. in Yoshiaki, 103.
- 32 McDougall.
- 33 Min, 941.
- 34 in Sangmie C. Schellstede, ed., *Comfort Women Speak: Testimony by Sex Slaves of the Japanese Military* (New York, NY: Holmes & Meier, 2000).
- 35 Min, 941.
- 36 Hein, 343.
- 37 Yoshiaki, 139.
- 38 in Schellstede, ed., 26.
- 39 Min, 941.
- 40 Yoshiaki, 140-141.
- 41 in Schellstede, ed., 71.
- 42 Hein, 340.
- 43 Hicks, 65.
- 44 Coomaraswamy.
- 45 in Schellstede, ed., 45.
- 46 Hicks, 65.
- 47 Kelly D. Askin, "Comfort Women – Shifting Shame and Stigma From Victims to Victimizers," *International Criminal Law Review*, vol. 1, (2001), 5-32.
- 48 in Schellstede, ed., 7.
- 49 Judith Kampfner, "Korean Sharing House," Soundprint Media Center, Inc. (19 Mar. 2006), <http://war_forgiveness.soundprint.org/essay.php>.
- 50 Ueno, 71.
- 51 Askin, 19.
- 52 Hicks, 125.
- 53 Min, 941.
- 54 in Schellstede, ed., 105.
- 55 Ueno, 69.
- 56 Soh, "Japan's Responsibility Toward Comfort Women Survivors."
- 57 "History of the Korean Council," The Korean Council for Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (2004), <http://www.womenandwar.net/english/menu_012.php>.
- 58 qtd. in Ueno, 70.
- 59 Oh, 16.
- 60 Ueno, 69.
- 61 Coomaraswamy, 125.
- 62 Oh, 16.
- 63 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, On the Issue of Wartime "Comfort Women" (4 Aug. 1993), <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/postwar/issue9308.html>>.
- 64 Soh, "Japan's Responsibility Toward Comfort Women Survivors."
- 65 Ibid.
- 66 Ueno, 181-182.
- 67 qtd. in Min, 946.
- 68 McDougall, par. 31, 69.
- 69 qtd. in Min, 945-946.
- 70 in Schellstede, ed., 40.
- 71 Oh, 16.
- 72 Soh, "Japan's Responsibility Toward Comfort Women Survivors."
- 73 "S. Korea Discloses Sensitive Documents."
- 74 Kyong-Bok Kwon, "Seoul Demanded \$364 Million for Japan's Victims," *The Chosun Ilbo* (17 Jan. 2005), <<http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200501/200501170044.html>>.
- 75 "Compensation for Colonial Victims Is Not Just a Legal Problem," *The Chosun Ilbo* (17 Jan. 2005),

- 76 <<http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200501/200501170025.html>>.
 77 "Declassified Documents Could Trigger Avalanche of Lawsuits."
 77 Ji-eun Shin, "Victims of Japanese Imperialism React to Documents' Release," *The Chosun Ilbo* (17 Jan. 2005), <<http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200501/200501170038.html>>.
 78 qtd. in Shin.
 79 Ibid.
 80 in Schellstede, ed., 40-41.
 81 Ibid.
 82 "Gov't in Fresh Compensation for Forced Labor Deaths," *The Chosun Ilbo* (17 Jan. 2005),
 <<http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200603/200603080028.html>>.
 83 Young-hee Shim, "Feminism and the Discourse of Sexuality in Korea: Continuities and Changes," *Human Studies*, vol. 24 (2001), 133-148.
 84 Ueno, 73.
 85 qtd. in Yoshiaki 199.
 86 Dai Sil Kim-Gibson, "Introduction," *Silence Broken: Korean Comfort Women* (Parkersburg, IA: Mid-Prairie Books, 1999), 1-11.
 87 Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1997), 53.
 88 "Women in Parliaments: World Classification," Interparliamentary Union (31 July, 2007), <<http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>>.

MICHELLE PARK

Michelle Park is a junior majoring in Human Biology at Stanford University. She is Co-President of kNOw More, a student organization that gives presentations to nearby high schools on teen relationship abuse. She also volunteers at the Center for Relationship Abuse Awareness based in Palo Alto, California. As an undergraduate, Michelle has conducted past research on issues pertaining to violence against women, especially relating to intimate partner abuse. Her other academic interests include women's health in ethnic minority or underserved communities, child and adolescent development in US public schools, and the foster care system.